Blog #55a – Why is there Inequality? It’s no Mystery

Blog #55a – Why is there Inequality in the U.S.A.?

An Answer in 22 and 7 words.

Piketty showed, in 648 pages, that inequality is increasing long-term. It continued in the short term:

In 2009, figures were: average net worth, top 1%;   $16,439,400   bottom 20% minus $14,000

Total Net Worth[1]      Top 1 percent              Bottom 80 percent

1983       33.8%                   18.7%

2010       35.4%                   11.1

Why is this so?

The wrong answers:

1.     Because the need for higher education and more skills is growing. Wrong because:

1. Access to higher education and skill training is controlled by the 1%. They support education that helps them produce profit, do not support that which could lead to criticism and organization for higher pay.
2. And higher pay and greater net worth are more related to parents’ incomes, s4ector of the economy, e.g. financial, education, social work, art, than to training and skills.

Because it is just, and criteria for justice in the distribution of income is that a person works harder, contribute more to society, is smarter, needs more, is justly entitled to have more. Wrong because:

2. Sitting in an office is not harder work than working on an assembly line or collecting garbage, but is paid more because hedge fund managers have more power than factory workers or garbage collectors.
3. And hedge fund managers do not contribute more to society than social workers or teachers, in fact do major damage.
4. And there is no evidence the 1% have higher innate IQ’s than the 99%.
5. And the 1% have more than they need, most of the 99% less.
6. And the 1% have vastly more than the 99% to begin with.

 

 

The right answer, in 22 words.

 

The 1% are rich because they profit by keeping the 99% poorer. There is only one pie to divide, whatever its size; if the 1% take more, the rest will take proportionately less..

Why is this so, in a democracy, and so little understood?

The wrong answer:

1.     Because the people wanted it that way. The wrong answer because:

2. Wealth provides political power also. And apparent prosperity co-opts opposition.

3. And the 1% control the means of mass communication, and bury the alternatives.And presumed experts of the 1% pontificate that trickle-down will work to the benefit of all.

4. And the 1% control the use of physical force, the use of incarceration, etc.

 

The right answer, in 7 words:

 

Political and economic democracy are too limited.

Blog #55b expands on this answer. Blog # 55c gives concrete examples.

[1] G. William Domhoff, at http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html

Blog #39 – Participatory Budgeting – Potentials and Limits

Participatory Budgeting – Potentials and Limits in New York ‘City               Peter Marcuse

Participatory budgeting, by which in New York City open public assemblies, in the district of each city councilperson choosing to participate meet and hear and debate proposals for the use of those limited capital funds allocated at the discretion of the council person. Their recommendations to him or her are in practice largely effective. It is a major approach to the difficult question of how to make governmental decisions both reasonably efficient and well structured, and at the same time really democratic, participatory, and transparent, all at the fundamental grass-roots level. [1]

The approach underling participatory budgeting can have, if fully pursued by a comprehensive Participatory budgeting system, a fundamental and quite radical impact on the nature of local government.  In two distinct ways: democratic participation, and democratic decision-making. As to participation it is a method of permitting input from citizens in a detailed, concrete, transparent fashion, open not only to essentially reactive public reactions to governmental proposals, but also permitting the injection of citizens own ideas and proposals into the political process. As to decision-making, it represents a degree of decentralization from the larger city-wide urban level to the districts of the 51 council members (the discussion here focuses on the program in New York City, now , thus approaching  its third year of use), a degree of decentralization approaching the old town meeting forms of direct democracy widely used at that much smaller scale in the early days of the United States in a largely rural society..

Participation could thus be much broader, more direct, and democratic. And decision-making could be much more directly open, grass-roots, and transparent.

In practice, the implementation of such a fully pursued comprehensive approach in New York City is very much more constrained and piece meal, very limited as to the subjects of participation and not pursued very far in the in decision-making process. . The scope of participation limited to the amounts in any council persons’ discretionary budget, typically around     $1,000,000[2] out of a total city budget of $100,000,000,000, including capital expenditures, typically about $20,000,000,000.  The council persons’ discretionary budgets are today limited to capital expenditures; operating costs of programs whether for job creation, job training, early childhood education, planning of transportation routes, zone changes, land use planning senior programs, etc., etc. are not included. Typically, city agency capital budgets are not reviewed, although they vastly exceed council discretionary budgets. The results of the neighborhood assemblies are not binding on council persons, and indeed open to being manipulated by them with an eye to solidifying a political base of support in the district.

The issues involved in the expansion of participatory budgeting as it now exists in New York City, to what a full-fledged comprehensive approach might be, are substantial, both politically and conceptually. Politically, the simple fact that only 9 of 51 council persons have agreed to participate, despite a multi-year effort, speaks volumes: active “outside” participation is seen as an infringement on their discretion even as to the expenditure of their limited discretionary funds; the concept of expansion to other budgetary decisions, and even policy decisions, may well not be greeted enthusiastically by most elected officials. A mayor’s position may be more open. Wider participation may be seen as a limitation on his discretion also, presenting new political problems. It may also be seen  as a substantive shift of power towards the mayor, as the original establishment of the 59 community boards in New York City was seen by then Mayor Wagner.

But to the conceptual problems. Simply to list them:

——————–

1. How should the scope of assembly-type participation be defined? All capital expenditures taking place in or affecting a district? The district operating budgets of all city agencies operating in the district? Some set proportion?
2. How can city-wide, as well as district-level, interests be taken into account? In the early models of participatory budgeting, e.g. Porto Alegre, sectoral assemblies were established, which included representatives of every district but examined the distribution of expenditures among districts to insurance equity.
3. How should districts be defined for purposes of participation? As it is, they are city council electoral districts. But electoral districts are notoriously defined by political result. Community district lines, postal Zip codes, school and operating agencies boundaries (already subject to a mandate for limited congruity). The process of defining electoral boundaries has resulted in massive data that could result in new district definitions. How should the problem be handled?
4. There is a history of expanding democratic participation in the City which needs to full reviewed. Perhaps most critically is the nature and role of Community Boards. They are an explicit move in the direction of decentralization of decision-making power and participation in public deliberations, including already a specific if limited role in budgeting. The present arrangement in effect creates a competing line of organization of local participation. Can the two be merged? Could they be integrated, by mutual consent, in deliberations? Should there be an effort to make the logical but even bigger move, to merge the boundaries for council districts and community boards, a logical but potentially treacherous political goal?
5. Can the innovative procedures for democratic participation pioneered by participatory budgeting movement be expanded to affect the city as a whole? Could the grass-roots strength of the existing assemblies be marshaled in a joint form, perhaps borough-wide (as community boars now are) or an assembly of assemblies, in any event ins such fashion that support for the process can be politically marshaled?
6. What should the city government’s role in the process be? Clearly, independence is sine qua non. But wouldn’t funding without control except for graft be a major support for the process? How far can volunteer and foundation-funded staffing go, what role should city agency employees be asked to play or be limited to playing?
7. How should participation in expenditure decisions be related to revenues derived from decisions as to taxation and handling of city economic development policies? Should not, for instance, the sale of city-owned property, or the privatization of service it is the city’s responsibility to deliver, e.g. garbage collection, security, building code inspection, park maintenance, be subject to participation?
8. Are there any structural changes in the organization of city government that might enhance the participatory budgeting process? For example, history the City Planning commission had the responsibility to review and act on the city’s capital budget before it went to the City Council. Might restoring its role provide a non-partisan and expert overview of local decisions that would be of benefit to all concerned? It might not be greeted enthusiastically by a mayor fearing diminution of his (or her?) own power—unless, that is, it is in fact seen as a  move towards further modernization and efficiency,  as well as a democratically related improvement in a difficult and complex process?
9. Participatory Budgeting is grounded in the desire to expand the scope of democracy in local government. That demand is sometimes in tension with the demand for social justice; often the two are seen as parallel but separate demands aiming at the creation of the Just City. But sometimes it is frankly generally recognized that the two can be in tension with each other, and one can be pursued without necessarily a commitment to the other. Where does the participatory budgeting process in New York stand on the issue? Is social justice a major element in its philosophy and practice? Can there be general guidelines for the objectives a proposal considered in the participatory budgeting process should follow (see 10. below?)
10. Should there be a set of principles expected to be followed by all decisions made through the process, e.g. non-discrimination, affirmative action, weighing of environmental consequences, social impact statements, inequality reduction?
11. How politically controversial should advocates for the participatory budgeting process get? Should they only promote the policy where those in power are friendly to it, or should they see it also as a part of an effort to further democracy where those in power are reluctant to potentially weaken their power by its introduction? Should proponents of the process be willing to be critical of the opposition to it, take on their arguments against it directly at their home base as well as commenting on it internally? Should they advocate for the City Council to adopt policies encouraging participatory budgeting in all districts, regardless of individual council members desire? Or format formal procedures for participatory budgeting that could be adopted by any council member at his or her option – perhaps creating controversy in some non-adopting districts? Or should they shrink back even from that?

Participatory budgeting can be a significant step forward in the exploration of ways of achieving real democracy at the grass-roots level, immediately in capital budget planning (by itself a key element in the shaping of the built environment and social structure of cities), but also more generally in the search for the mechanisms by which truly democratic planning and decision-making  might be accomplished, keeping in mind the legitimate needs for efficiency and the practical needs for political realism.

But participatory budgeting can also be a will-o-the-wisp, or worse. It can be used simply as a sophisticated way for those already in position of political power and influence to get information about what some active among their constituency think and want, akin to polling, but with the added advantage of giving the respondents the feeling they are participating in decision-making, While in fact their participation if at a minimal level of power over a minimal range of decisions.  Thus it can be a co-optive mechanism using sophisticated technical forms to reinforce existing patterns of conduct by those in power. The devil is both in the details and, perhaps even more, in the broader perspective in which it viewed.

---

[1] The process, and a quite general statement of its goals, are at: http://www.participatorybudgeting.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Rulebook.pdf. What follows may be seen as a commentary addressed to those goals and the strategic issues involved in their possible implementation.

[2] A minimum. See http://council.nyc.gov/downloads/pdf/budget/2014/14budget.pdf for a simplified presentation. Some of the funds further have specific restrictions, e.g. for non-profit social service agencies, senior services, youth programs, etc.

Blog #38 – Community Land Trusts: Empty, Moderate, and Full-bodied.

Community Land Trusts – Empty, Moderate, or Full-bodied?

Community land trusts,[1] as a legal form of ownership of land, can come in three different forms: empty – available to any group for any purpose; moderate – to deal with serious but limited problems for a limited group, or full-bodied – handling both immediate problems but with a broad social justice perspective pushing transformative content and actions.

The differences are significant. Community land trusts can simply be an expanded form of co-operative ownership used by those protecting an already strong position in the housing market, insulating its members from outside influences by exclusion. The legal form of land trust is available to all, and ”community” can be interpreted restrictively by the well-to-do as easily as broadly by less well-off users. Thus, community land trusts as an empty form.

At the other extreme on a scale of social justice, community land trusts have the potential to play a transformative role in our housing systems, favoring lower-income households and all those ill served by existing markets, including poor households, the homeless, African-Americans and ethnic minorities, many women, households diverse by gender relations, age, and background.  -justice focused community land trusts can whittle away at the dominance of the private market as a method of allocating housing. Community land trusts can be models of democratic governance, both internally and at a larger scale of governance. And they can help in the political processes by which public resources are allocated to establish and implement a meaningful right to housing for all. Thus, necessarily, full=bodied community land trusts .

Community land trusts may also be transformative in a quite different context: achieving effective grass-roots democracy. If extended, community land trusts may be seen as a form of neighborhood self-government, in fact controlling land uses and what goes with them in an unquestionably powerful manner, viz. having legal title to the land. But such a potential for community land trusts is not at this point seriously in the picture. The tie-in with other social movements pressing for democratization of land use controls and the planning function of government should not be ignored, however.

In between these two extremes lie a wide variety of variations in form and content. The exclusionary use of community land trusts would presumably be rejected by most. There is a danger of co-optation by interests posing community land trusts  as an alternative to public housing or rent regulation or subsidies or favorable tax treatment for those in need. Presumably, also, a formal commitment to principles of social justice and serving those in need would be part of any mainstream moderate position. But how sharply to focus their immediate goals, how widely or narrowly to devote their energies, how to use limited resources, with whom to ally and who to confront in adversarial fashion, how far and in what manner to be politically engaged, are all matters in which strategy as well as principle. Compromises will be inevitable. Thus, moderate community land trusts.

Where in this spectrum of possible community land trusts  a given effort stands seems to me to depend on three factors.

1. How seriously is “community” taken? Community land trusts can be simply a legal form of holding title, used for tax and financing purposes, but in daily use essentially a management company, negotiating with utilities, contractors, maintenance staff, etc. Or it can be seen as a part of an effort for form and maintain a communal level of social interaction, involving not only collective democratic decision-making but a sharing of activities, of information, of social responsibilities, of political involvement. It can affirmatively work on positive relationships with its outside neighboring community, having not only neighborhood representatives on it boards but helping integrate its residents in its community, more widely defined, sharing facilities, activities, information, as circumstances suggest. Likewise, it can affirmatively look to achieve and make use of a diversity of residents, including both levels of recognition and of assimilation comfortable to each.
2. How, and how clearly, is the constituency of the community land trust understood? A community land trust has control over who its members are, can have processes similar to those of cooperatives in interviewing potential new members. But there are general principles that must be established, and they will influence not only who is in the community land trust but what its relations with its outside community and government will be. Specifically, income levels and household composition can be defined as criteria.
3.  If the principles of social justice are followed, it also becomes more likely that the community land trust will operate as a full-bodied trust.
4. How does the community land trust see its political role? Every community land trust except an exclusionary one of the well-to-do faces the reality that many to whom it would like to be open cannot afford even the non-profit real costs of decent housing. The need may go from an immediate need for help even with basic costs or special needs to an on-going concern about rising costs or changed incomes limiting what a household can afford.  That inevitably means a concern with governmental subsidies, levels of taxation, utility costs, building codes, public services, public facilities. But the problems community land trusts  face are shared by a large part of the population as a whole. If the community land trust sees itself as part of a broader movement to achieve social justice in the provision of housing, perhaps as part of a broad right to housing movement, it will be more and more a full-bodied community land trust both in its inception and its ongoing daily activities.

A note on the ideological and economic aspects of community land trusts:

The idea of community land trusts resonates with an old theme in economics: that of land as a common natural resource, one not the product of human efforts, and therefore not to be appropriated by individuals for their private use, but to be shared among all. Community land trusts can be seen as an implementation of that view, at least on a small scale: no individual has the legal right to dispose of his or her interest in a community land trust for personal gain. Yet, theoretically, the ability to sell an interest in a building built on land in a community land trust at a price for that building fixed in a private market will take into account that that interest is made more attractive by its ground lease. Thus a likely profit can in fact ensue to the seller of a community land trust unit, amounting to an ability to make a private profit from a natural resource,. The market value of a building or unit in a community land trust building is technically the price of a commodity.. The land itself may be decommodified, but the right to use it is valuable, and could be realized by a sale of what is on the land and benefits a private owner from its common ownership. The land is decommodified, but not necessarily the building on it, to which the value of participation in the community land trust accrues.

What makes the typical community land trust radical is not the separation of land from building and its character as natural resource, but rather the restrictions that the classic community land trust, moderate to full-bodied, imposes on those leasing the right to occupy from the trust. Those restrictions typically regulate the price at which a housing unit in a community land trust can be sold. In these community land trusts , the leases to occupant members either prohibits the occupant from selling the unit except at a price established by the board of the trust, or gives the trust itself the right to buy at a fixed and limited price if the unit is put up for sale. . In this way community land trusts operate as would a limited equity co-op; the separation out of land ownership is simply another way of controlling collectively the price of units in it, as well usually as the characteristics of new buyer occupants. It is the restrictions in the permitted sales of units in a community land trust which make it an ideologically radical idea, and the terms of that restriction set the extent of the radicalism. If limited to an original price, originally set not aiming at a profit, and usually increasing only to the extent of the occupants own investment of money or labor in the unit, that makes it radical, for it effectively takes the unit out of the housing market and eliminates its use as a provider of private profit. A resident of a classic community land trust has virtually all the rights of a home owner, except the right to sell at a profit.  It turns housing into a set of use values, rather than of exchange values.[2]

Community land trusts may also be transformative in a quite different context: achieving effective grass-roots democracy. If extended, community land trusts may be seen as a form of neighborhood self-government, in fact controlling land uses and what goes with them in an unquestionably powerful manner, viz.having legal title to the land. But such a potential for community land trusts is not at this point seriously in the picture. The tie-in with other social movements pressing for democratization of land use controls and the planning function of government should not be ignored, however.

All this has two implications. One is that such a community land trust cannot be seen as a “creator of wealth.” The opportunity to benefit from a speculative increase in the value of land is denied the owner. That may make a community land trust less attractive to some, but may be welcomed by others, and should in any event be clear in the use of the community land trust form of ownership. The other implication is the need for thoughtful consideration of how permitted sale prices are established. While the principle of non-speculation is clear, its definition is not quite. Specifically: typically, the seller is allowed to recover his or her purchase price plus investments. But usually that purchase price is adjusted by some formulae, such as changes in the cost of living, benchmarked to some measure of the rate of inflation, at least on the up side. That means it has some characteristics of an investment that does have market advantages: it is protected from erosion by inflation. It has the additional market advantage, the more full-bodied the community land trust is, of having collective backing against personal misfortune; foreclosure is technically impossible and eviction for non-payment of rent is handled more humanely than it is in the market, again to varying degrees. That benefit is of course realized to some extent in directly market terms when it comes to financing; a bank is likely to recognize the stability provided by the collective responsibilities and spread out risk inherent in the community land trust form as opposed to conventional single-family home ownership.

So “decommodification”  is not complete, but is certainly ideologically challenged by the use of the community land trust form, and its extent will vary with the details of the trust instrument and the leases given pursuant to it.

And if the above economic analysis is right, it provides some solace for potential participants in a community land trust that, while they may not accumulate speculatively-driven wealth by participation, they do achieve definite economic advantages in terms of security, both of occupancy and of return of original investment.

My own take, again if the above analysis is correct, on implications for community land trust practitioners:

Be clear who your constituency is. (Point 1 above.)

1. Stress the “community” in community land trusts when presenting them. (Point 2
2. Be clear and up front where you stand on the importance of social justice in the spectrum between moderate and full-bodied community land trust.  (point 3)
3. Be politically active in coalition formation with other social justice oriented organizations and actors, and join with them both in obtaining the necessary support and subsidies for community land trusts  and in supporting other housing rights organizations program proposals for governmental action in the housing field, particularly on financing and rent regulation and affirmative non-discrimination. (Point 4.)
4. Be up front about community land trusts’ impacts on wealth accumulation (minimal) and its other economic advantages: security of tenure and investment.  (Note on ideological and economic aspects.)

pmarcuse.WordPress.com  Blog#38.

[1] A community land trust is a legal form in which the ownership of land is held in the form of a trust and separated from the ownership of any structures that may be on it, which are privately (often in the form of a co-op or mutual housing association) built, occupied, and managed, subject to the term of a land lease from the trust. The trust is typically controlled by a board in which the actual users of the buildings on it are the primary members, together usually with representatives of the neighboring community and/or relevant government representatives. The leaseold interest with the users of the building have can be sold  subject to the provisions of the lease from the trust, which typically limits its resale price and must approve the buyer. An excellent fact sheet,  which also contains further useful links,.is at http://picturethehomeless.org/publications.html,,

[2] The myth that home ownership per se is a reliable way to accumulate needs to be dispelled. Home owners accumulate wealth only through two aspects of home ownership: one is savings, the other is speculation. The savings are essentially the forced setting aside of money to pay off a loan, the mortgage. Alternate investments of savings might do even better, and be subject to less risk. The other source of additional wealth creation from home ownership lies in the possibility of capturing the increase in the value of the house, which is fundamentally of the location on it is built, for the physical building itself depreciates. Again, that’s a speculative investment, and not always a safe one, as today’s economy shows. And see the historical experience recounted in Sclar, Elliott, Matthew Edel. and Daniel Luria. 1984. Shaky Palaces: Home ownership and Social Mobility in Boston’s Suburbanization.  New York Columbia University Press 1984.

Blog #33 – The Five Paradoxes of Public Space, with Proposals

Blog #33  – The Five Paradoxes of Public Space, with Proposals

A key, but not the only, aspect of public space is the role it plays in permitting popular public participation in democratic governance, democratic political decision-making. For the United States, it might be called “First Amendment Space,” after the provision in the U.S.A. Constituting establishing the rights of free speech and free assembly.  In a broader sense, public space should also be available democratically and based on equality of rights  for a full range of social interchanges, for recreation, sports, picnicking, hiking,  running, sitting, chatting, simply enjoyment, by all people, equally. Such uses, carried out democratically, are in turn necessary for democratic governance, but in a different way. Let me call them “Social Spaces.“ And they may be divided between Convening spaces, where convening for the purposes of political effectiveness may be planned, and Encounter Spaces, where chance meetings and discussion may btake place without prior planning/convesning.  “Infrastructural Spaces” are also social spaces but in a different sense, not directly political: spaces for transportation, streets, sidewalks, recreational areas, parks, hiking trails, bicycles partially. he term “Third Space” is sometimes in fashion in a similar sense, and often defined as somewhere between public and private.[1] More on social spaces elsewhere. When public space is referred to here, it is in the sense of political public space,  First Amendment space in the United States. Tahrir Square in Cairo, the Playa of Mothers in Buenos Aires, the Mall in Washington, D.C., Zuccotti Park in New York City, perhaps Central Park or Fifth Avenue, with its parades and marches, but also the fenced in space under the West Side highway at the time of the Republican Convention, and perhaps the indoor space of the Convention Center, as used for convening for discussions of alternate proposals for rebuilding after 9/11.

Five paradoxes, five proposals, one warning.

Paradox 1: The paradox of public space and democracy:To have truly democratic public spaces, you have to have a truly democratic society.But to have a truly democratic society, you have to have democratic public spaces—

The means and the end are inseparable: as we are witnessing today throughout the Near East, a public  space in a society that is not (yet, at least) democratic will not remain open for vibrant democratic discussion long. Only in a democratic society will the state’s use of tear gas be unthinkable.The effective use of public space is almost a sine qua non for the achievement of a democratic society, again as we have recently seen in the Near East.

The connection between political democracy (see economic democracy below) is most obvious in the ways in which the state regulates public space, and the decision-making process by which its regulations are agree upon. The process as it now stands in the United States in a sense ignores confronting the relationship between democracy and public space. The regulation of public space is largely administrative, e.g. Park Department rules, with minimal informed public participation. For instance, I have tried to find he criteria by which he use of Bryant Park is determined by he Park Department, and have just gotten the run-around; the rules are just submit your application, and if it fits we’ll let you know. Even more seriously, the provision of democratic public space is not seen as a formal function of government. The constitution proclaims a right of free assembly for the presentation of grievances;; should it not be understood that that implies an affirmative obligation to make space available for such free assembling?

So:

Proposal 1: Each city should have a public democratic First Amendment spaces plan as part of its regular plan for the city’s development and administration. That plan should include not only the desired extent, locations, and design features of public space in the city, but also the principles for the regulation and management of the uses of all public owned or controlled spaces permitting full exercise of democratic political (first amendment) rights, giving such rights priority.

Much of what is now public space is already owned by and planned for by cities: parks, plazas, sports facilities, waterfronts, streets for parades and street fairs, auditoriums in public schools . There should be a comprehensive plan regulating all such places and uses, taking into consideration a priority for the defined exercise of constitutional rights of assembly, and expanding such places if they are inadequate.

Paradox 2: The paradox of public space and equality

To have truly democratic public space, you cannot have gross inequalities of wealth..But to limit gross inequalities of wealth, you need to have truly democratic public spaces.

It is not a coincidence that when Zuccotti Park was put to a classic First Amendment use, it was done under the banner of Occupy Wall Street, taken as a symbol of grossly unequal wealth. . Inequalities of wealth and democracy are in constant tension with each other.  Our experience in the United States,  as in the last election and recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings, is a classic example of that tension.     A gross inequality in wealth results in a gross inequality in political power, which in turn leads to a gross limitation of democracy. In order to address gross inequalities of wealth, you need true democracy, for which in turn (paradox one) you need truly public space in which citizens may assemble for the exercise of their democratic rights.. But in turn, to have truly public space, you need to address gross inequalities of wealth. Not unexpectedly, our billionaire mayor in New York City whose firm is based on reporting on Wall Street’s ups and downs, disagrees.

But even further gross inequalities of wealth lead to gross inequalities in the ownership of land and the buildings built on land. For the greatest restraint on the ability to assemble freely in public spaces is in practice the limited availability of such spaces (and the lack of planning for them, as above discussed). But stepping back, the biggest reason for the limited availability of such spaces is, simply and tautologically, the dominating presence of non-public spaces, that is, private spaces, and their control through a system of property rights in which economic wealth and power largely dictate what uses are in fact permitted and what are not.

So:

Proposal 2: The city should, based on the plan of Proposal 1, have a capital budget that provides for the acquisition, by eminent domain if necessary, of adequate public space to serve democratic political purposes,

Paradox 3: The paradox of public vs. private spaces.

Certain types of private spaces are essential for the functioning of public spaces.

But the privatization of public space also inhibits their public use.

On the one hand, some enhance public use.  On the other hand, the existence of certain kinds of private space is essential for public spaces to best serve their desired functions.

Some commercial uses can serve to enhance the public use and enjoyment of a park, or other public space. The availability of food service is a classic case, and vendors are unobjectionable from almost any point of view. If it enhances other public uses, recreation, education, appreciation of nature, simply enjoyment, fine. Sidewalk cafes an obvious example, and even take into account one First Amerndment right, although not the one we are here concerned with, limited commercial uses can actually facilitate peaceable assembly (fast food vendors at the Mall in Washington).^[2]

Some private uses in fact enhance the purposes of First Amendment public space. For most political actions in fact start there. Democratic political action does not ultimately spring from organized political action, but democratic political action rests on a citizenry brought together in social, rather than political or commercial, forums, which are today not a subject of governmental action. ^[3].

On the other hand, permitting private uses of public space may limit their availability and usefulness. Bryant Park, on 42d street in New York City, behind the New York Public Library and five minutes from Times Square, one of the busiest places in the world, is clearly a public space that lends itself ideally for public events, including First Amendment types. But its use is controlled, by law, by a private corporation, the Bryant Park Corporation. The Corporation  is open about its missions: they include “enhance[ing] the real estate values of its neighbors,”[4] and it is “privately funded and operates Bryant Park with private sector techniques and management methods. “  It is open about its available uses of the space. In applying for a use, the applicant is presented with a questionnaire, which includes the question: “Is the event public or private,?” but no detail is readily available at what private events would be considered. Nor is information given as to the criteria by which conflicting requests for use are judged.

Some purely commercial uses obviously preclude such a public space from performing its function as First Amendment space.; other commercial uses may enhance its effectiveness for political discussions and  even assemblies. But others do not: Fashion shows, shooting movies that involving blocking off and limiting access to the space involved, do not enhance the use and enjoyment of that space.

Putting public space to effective First Amendment thus use requires a calibrated relationship to private spaces and private uses. There pressures to see it as a possible money-maker, enabling ita to become “self-supporting,”  are understandable But iIt would be ironic if the maintenance of public space could only be provided for by its privatization, taking it out of public use.

So:

Proposal 3a: For democratic political uses, the private use of spaces, both publicly owned and privately owned, and their relation to each other should be carefully scrutinized, and made subject to direct local input or more depending on scale,[5] as proposal 1 suggested.

The concept of places of public accommodation is well known in the context of civil rights: there are permissible and impermissible uses of such places, and they are clearly subject to law. Some places of public accommodation: banquet halls, community rooms, lobbies and plazas, are open by law or zoning codes, and can reasonably be used for occasional public discussions, with discrimination prohibited. 60 Wall Street is a recent ideal example.

They might be made subject to open use subject to first amendment requirements, which include the preparation of regulations as now permitted governing reasonable time, description of place, and manner.

Would not a simple provision in the zoning code providing for bonuses for the provision of space specifically designed and managed for use as political public space, geared to the availability of such space in each neighborhood, be a useful possibility? But such possibilities are not even on the table today, not even for discussion. You would need a very self-confident, seasoned, committed democratic governments to do so, because the spaces requested might well be used to criticize the very government that permitted its use. They should be.

Perhaps it might be called a Plan for Communal spaces Perhaps the way in which city owned or leased spaces are used by community boards, in the city’s 59 community districts, could be an example. Or private adaptable communal spaces could be given real estate credit in any building providing them, conditional on their being publicized. Perhaps even temporary communal uses of empty store fronts, as targeted by No Longer Empty, might be models.

Public policy recognizes the problem in many ways: zoning imposes limits (but only hesitantly)  is pro-active in promoting particular uses – bonuses for plazas, theaters, tax exemptions for certain uses, etc.. The proposal for zoning bonuses mentioned above would be a positive addition to that list. Making provision for public political use a requirement goes a step further, and directly limits the power of wealth reflected in private ownership to constrain the exercise of democratic rights of assembly and democratic political participation.

Proposal 3b: Affirmative inducements may be provided publicly for private property owners to permit or even encourage the use of private property for public First Amendment purposes.

Paradox 4: The social and convening and infrastructure uses of public space contradict each other.

The use of public space for social purposes can interfere with its use for convening free assemblies. But social spaces are necessary for the organization of convening assemblies.

You cannot have chairs and tables, such as facilitate social interaction and initial organizing, scattered around a space where a mass assembly of people is to be convened.

Proposal 4: Utilize the advantages of technology and good design to make space adaptable, as in the New York convention center assemblies on the planning of the World Trade Center site after 9/11, or the design of Time Square serving both social and emergency transportation needs., or bullarards and barriers see used both for security and places to eat lunch on.

FINALLY, AND MOST CRITICALLY:

Paradox 5:  the best use of public space is illegal, and necessarily so.

To get the attention necessary for fully democratic discussion, a disruption of normal routines, of expected occurrences, is optimal. But that means disregarding normal rules and regulations,

And often for purposes critical of the instuitutions imposing such rules.

Unplanned, unpermitted use of public spaces by assemblies increases their visibility and their often desired disruptive capacity. But by the same token they contravene law and official regulations.

The most important democratic political use of public space is for the exercise of the First Amendment right of peaceable assembly for the redress of grievances, grievance addressed specifically to the government that makes the public space available. But any government thus far known to man or woman would feel itself attacked by such assembling, and have a strong interest in restraining it. There is thus an inevitable tension arising from the clear incentive government has to restrict the use of space being used to criticize it. It is no coincidence that police departments use heavy-handed tactics in destroying Occupy encampments wherever they feel they lawfully can.  (toss books in dump trucks, destroy food, take away heaters, make arrests, use billy clubs.

Proposal 5: Accept the fact that it is so, and educate law enforcement and court officials to respect the motives of those breaching regulations on the use of space in how offenders are treated.  Do the exact opposite of what is increasingly the common practice in the handling of such breaches through the criminal justice system.

These five paradoxes can perhaps be seen as instances of a larger vicious circle, an expansion of  Paradox 1: “to achieve a free society, you need free individuals, but you can only have free individuals in a free society.”[6] A vicious circle, but not a deadly one. It simply means that the two are inseparable, and one has to move on the two fronts simultaneously, in parallel. So specifically, in the context of this conference, it means that the effort to create democratic public space must be seen as part of the effort to achieve democracy itself. The two must go hand in hand.

 * * * * *

And so a warning . It is ultimately the importance of democracy that makes achieving democratic public spaces so important, and that undergirds the argument that they be well designed. . The availability of public space for democratic purposes should not be fetishized,[7] and the role of good physical design in its use should not lose sight of the greater purpose to be served: the promotion of democracy.  The design process itself, as well as its results, can be a contribution to that goal. But formal legal and management arrangements are, in the first place, critical. Legalizing Zuccotti Park, for example, or any occupied site, is not a goal in itself; dealing directly with the inequalities of wealth and of undemocratic power, is.

The goal is democracy, not a particular form of public space, although it can be an important means to that end.

————————–

[1] The term “third space” or its equivalent has been used in many different ways: spaces between home and work (Oldenberg Oldenburg, Ray (1989). The Great Good Place: Cafes, Coffee Shops, Community Centers, Beauty Parlors, General Stores, Bars, Hangouts, and How They Get You Through the Day. New York: Paragon House and (2000). Celebrating the Third Place: Inspiring Stories about the “Great Good Places” at the Heart of Our Communities. New York: Marlowe & Company. Sociologists sometimes use the term to describe neighborhood or community spaces that are not publicly owned nor privately exclusive. For a set of well-done examples, see the special issue of Shelterforce, Hearts of the Neighborhood, National Housing Institute, Montclair, New Jersey, Fall 2012. Edward Soja has used the term in what has been called post-modern fashion in Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1996. Places of public accommodation, in civil rights law, has a similar intermediate meaning. Virtual space is a quite difference meaning of the same “third space” term.

[2] The other First Amendment right, freedom of speech, can come into play here too. Sidewalk displays and sales of art, or perhaps of books, are treated differently from sales of sunglasses or umbrellas in New York City.

[3] The discussion above neglects an important aspect of public space, alluded to in the opening: democratic public space also involved equality of rights in its use for a full range of social interchanges, for recreation, sports, picnicking, hiking,  running, sitting, chatting, simply enjoyment, by all people, equally. For such uses in turn promote the capacity and the desire of citizens to exercise their rights in all spheres, to address together issues of democracy and equality. Their importance adds to the challenges to both the design process and design results

[4] http://www.bryantpark.org/about-us/mission.html

[5] Simpler and even more democratic forms of land ownership may simplify and further democraticiz the use of land. The suggestion of the Planners Network of the United Kingdom goes in that direction:

Sustainable places cannot be achieved without the public and community sector having a long term stake in land and development. We must learn the lessons of New Towns and Garden Cities, and successful community development trusts in the UK, where land is held in common ownership by local authorities or trusts. In these communities, the benefits of land value uplift and the income from developments on community owned land are recycled back into the community to spend on services, better maintenance of property, parks and playgrounds, and on building housing or workshops for local need. In this model, the community is the long term steward of the land, looking after it as an asset for present and future generations http://pnuk.wikispaces.com/file/view/20121027pnukmanifesto.pdf  Draft Manifesto on Land Use Planning and Development, Planners Network of the United Kingdom

[6] As formulated in depth by the Frankfurt School and I think most sharply by Herbert Marcuse.

[7] See Blog #5. The Purpose Of The Occupation Movement And The Danger Of Fetishizing Space, at pmarcuse.wordpress.com.

[Revised version of a paper prepared for the Conference, “Putting Public Space in its Place,” at Harvard University, March, 2013, hosted by Prof. Jerrold Kayden. ]

 

Blog # 22 Vacant Housing and Sandy

Vacant Housing and Sandy: a Proposal

It is an abomination to have people desperately in need of housing, both emergency after Sandy and long-term, at the same time that there is a stock of vacant, good quality, accessible housing being held off the market because its owner believes that the market will improve and he/she/it will make more money by waiting to make it available.

The City’s official Housing and Vacancy Survey , undertaken by the Bureau of the Census, lists 68,031, rental units vacant and available, and 31,000vacant units available for sale. Picture the Homeless’s count of vacant buildings in 1/3 of the city calculated that 3,551 vacant buildings in could house 71,707 people.2

At the same time, somewhere between 30,000 and 40,000 families are in need of shelter because of Sandy, according to the Mayor.3 Public housing residents were particularly hard hit.4

Proposal: A city ordinance that would require any person or firm controlling the occupancy of a housing unit that has been held vacant for more than 6 months to file a report with the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development providing the address of the unit, its condition, the length of the vacancy, and the reason for the vacancy. If the Mayor declares a Housing Emergency based on a finding of substantial displacement caused by conditions affecting the housing stock, HPD would be directed to examine all vacancy filings and would be authorized to take control of, commandeer, any unit it finds for the purpose of providing emergency shelter to a household in need thereof because of the emergency, and facilitate its use for the purpose of providing emergency shelter.5

Since the use of such a unit does not cause any loss of income to its owner, being vacant when put to such emergency use, the owner would only be compensated for it use after the end of the emergency and after the displacee has found other adequate accommodations, and any additional costs to the landlord would be shared between the city and the displace, based on ability to pay.

Such an ordinance might also have the desirable side effect of discouraging the warehousing of vacant units awaiting a more profit-producing market, when there is general housing need and restricted housing availability.

The ordinance might also be framed to make mortgage foreclosed properties, if REO and held vacant by the mortgage-holder, subject to commandeering for emergency housing. This might again have the side effect of making mortgagees less prone to foreclose.

1. “In 2011, the number of vacant available rental units was 68,000, while the number of
vacant units available for sale was 31,000. At the same time, the number of vacant
units not available for sale or rent was 164,000 in 2011, the highest since 1965, when
the first HVS was conducted (Table 1).” Selected Initial Findings of the 2011 New York City
Housing and Vacancy Survey, Prepared by Dr. Moon Wha Lee
Assistant Commissioner for Housing Policy Analysis and Statistical Research
New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development
February 9, 2012, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/downloads/pdf/HPD-2011-HVS-Selected-Findings-Tables.pdf
2. Banking on Vacancy: Homelessness and Real Estate Speculation. A Report by Picture the Homeless, p. 19. See also: Community Voices Heard, A Count of Vacant Condos in Select New York City Neighborhood, Right to the City Alliance, 2010.
3. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-20199672
4. http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/nycha-tenants-struggle-survive-heat-water-post-sandy-article-1.1196965 Community
6. HPD would further be authorized to investigate the circumstances of any vacancy called to its attention as potentially available for purposes of the law, including information from groups such as Picture the Homeless, Community Voices Heard, public housing or other tenant organizations, and if it find that they should have been listed and are shown to be appropriate for purposes of the law, to also take control of them for those purposes.

My housing publications

Housing titles July 14, 2011

 

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1981. “The Determinants of Housing Policy,” New York, Columbia University, Division of Urban Planning, Papers in Planning No. 21a.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1976. “Mass Transit for the Few,” Society, Vol. 13, No. 6, September‑October.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1971. “Social Indicators and Housing Policy,” Urban Affairs Quarterly, December.

 

Marcuse, Peter.  1971.  Tenant Participation ‑‑ for What?, Washington D.C., The Urban Institute, Working Paper  No. 112‑20, July 30, 1970.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1971. “The Rise of Tenant Organizations,” The Nation, July; printed in Housing in America, Daniel Mandelker and Roger Montgomery (eds.), Indianapolis: The Bobbs‑Merrill Co., Inc., pp. 492‑9, 1973 and 1979; also reprinted in Housing Urban America, John Pynoos, Robert Schaffer, and Chester M. Hartman, eds., Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., pp. 49‑54, 1973 and 1981.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1972. “Homeownership for Low Income Families: Financial Implications” Land Economics, Volume 48, Number 2, May, 1972, pp. 134-143

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1972. “Indicators for Housing Policy,” Environmental Design: Research and Practice, Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference, Environmental Design Research Association, Los Angeles, January.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1972. “How to Have Your Cake and Eat it Too ‑‑ a New Tax Proposal that Helps the Cities, Yet Costs the Local Taxpayer Virtually Nothing,” Architectural Forum, March.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1972. “The Legal Attributes of Home Ownership.” Washington, D. C., The Urban Institute, April 13, Working Paper #209‑1‑1.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1972. “Home Ownership for Low Income Families: Legal and Financial Implications” Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley.

 

Marcuse, Peter. with Richard Clark, “Tenure and the Housing System: The Relationship and the Potential for Change,” Working Paper 209‑8‑4, Urban Institute, 1973.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1975. “Residential Alienation, Home Ownership and the Limits of Shelter Policy,” Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare,  Vol. III,. 2, November. pp. 181‑203.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1978. “Housing Policy and the Myth of the Benevolent State,” Social Policy, Jan. Feb. Reprinted in Housing in America: Problems and Perspectives, Roger Montgomery and Daniel Mandelker, 2nd edition, Indianapolis: Bobbs‑Merrill, 1979, and in Critical Perspectives on Housing, Rachel Bratt, Chester Hartman, and Ann Meyerson, eds., Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1979. “The Deceptive Consensus on Redlining,” in Journal of the American Planning Association, 45, 4, October.

 

Marcuse, Peter. “The Ideologies of Ownership and Property Rights,” in Richard Plunz, ed. Housing Form and Public Policy in the United States, Columbia Monographs on Architecture, Preservation and Planning, New York: Praeger Publishers,

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1981. “The Strategic Potential of Rent Control,” in Rent Control: A Source Book, John I. Gilderbloom (ed.), San Francisco, Foundation for National Progress.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1982. “Building Housing Theory: Notes on some Recent Work,” in International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 115‑121.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1982.”The Determinants of State Housing Policies: West Germany and the United States,”in Norman and Susan Fainstein, eds., Urban Policy under Capitalism, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1982. Housing Abandonment: Does Rent Control Make a Difference, Washington, D. C., Conference on Alternative State and Local Policies.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1983. “On the Ambiguities of Self‑help in Housing,” New York, Columbia University Division of Urban Planning, Papers in Planning, October.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1983. “A Luxury Housing Tax,” in City Limits, December.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1983. “Towards the Decommodification of Housing: A Political Analysis and a Progressive Program,” with Emily Achtenberg, in Chester Hartman (ed.), America’s Housing Crisis: What is to be done?, Institute for Policy Studies, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Boston; reprinted in Critical Perspectives on Housing, Rachel Bratt, Chester Hartman, and Ann Meyerson, eds., Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1984. Report on Study of Displacement in New York City, with Conclusions and Recommendations, New York, Community Service Society.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1985. “Gentrification, Abandonment, and Displacement:  Connections, Causes, and Policy Responses in New York City,” Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law, Volume 28, St. Louis, Washington University, pp. 195‑240. Reprinted in revised form in Smith, Neil, and Peter Williams, eds. 1986. Gentrification and the City, London, Allen and Unwin.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1985. “The Housing Policy of Social Democracy: Determinants and Consequences,”in Anson Rabinbach., ed., The Austrian Socialist Experiment, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1984‑5. “To Control Gentrification: Anti‑Displacement Zoning and Planning for Stable Residential Districts,” New York University  Review of Law and Social Change, Vol. XIII, No. 4, pp. 931‑952, reprinted in Yearbook of Construction Articles, Washington, D.C.: Federal Publications, 1985.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1986. “The Beginnings of Public Housing in New York,” in Journal of Urban History, Vol. 12, No. 4:353‑390 August.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1986. “A Useful Installment of Socialist Work: Housing in Red Vienna in the 1920s,” in Critical Perspectives on Housing, Rachel Bratt, Chester Hartman, and Ann Meyerson, eds., Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1986. Review of Bullock, N. and Read, J.  The Movement for Housing Reform in Germany and France, 1840 ‑ 1914, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. In the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, spring, 1986.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1986. The Uses and Limits of Rent Control: A Report with Recommendations, State of New York, Division of Housing and Community Renewal, December.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1987. “Why Are They Homeless,” The Nation, April 4, vol. 244, No. 13. Reprinted in Eitzen, D. Stanley, ed., Social Problems, Allyn & Bacon, and in Kennedy, Williams, ed., Writing in the Disciplines, Prentice Hall.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1987. “The Other Side of Housing: Oppression and Liberation,” in Bengt Turner et al, eds. Between State and Market: Housing in the Post‑Industrial Era, Göteborg, Sweden, pp. 232‑270.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1987. “Housing as Discipline: Beyond Decommodification,” New York, Columbia University Division of Urban Planning, Papers in Planning.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1988. “Neutralizing Homelessness.” Socialist Review, 88:1, pp. 69‑97. Reprinted in part in Lisa Orr. 1990. The Homeless: Opposing Viewpoints. San Diego, Greenhaven Press.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1988. “Divide and Siphon: New York City Builds on Division,”  City Limits, Vol. XIII, No. 3, March, pp. 8‑11.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1988. “Criticism or Cooptation: Can Architects Reveal the Sources of Homelessness?” Crit 20. Spring, p. 30.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1988. “Perspectives on Homelessness.” [Book review] Urban Affairs Quarterly, vol. 23, No. 4, June, pp. 647‑656.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1989. “Towards Clarity in East/West Housing Studies: Some Conceptual Issues of ‘Market’ and ‘State'”, Conference Paper, Noszvaj, Hungary, June.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1989. “Gentrification, Homelessness, and the Work Process: Housing Markets and Labour Markets in the Quartered City,” Housing Studies, vol. 4, No. 3, p. 211‑220. Reprinted as “Housing MarketsandLabourMarkets in theQuarteredCity,” inJohnAllenandChrisHamnett.1991, Housing and Labour Markets: Building the Connections, London: Unwin Hyman, pp. 118‑135.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1989. “Homelessness and Housing Policy” in Carol Caton, ed., Homeless in America, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 138‑159.

 

“Off Site Displacement: How the Changing Economic Tide of a Neighborhood Can Drown Out the Poor,” with Raun Rasmussen and Russel Engler, Clearinghouse Review of National Clearinghouse for Legal Services, vol. 22, No. 11, April 1989, pp. 1352‑70.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1990. Review of Irving Welfeld, Where We Live.       American Political Science Review,  vol 84.

 

“Comprehensive Planning‑‑Not!” [The New York City C.H.A.S.] City Limits, June/July, 1992, p. 22.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1992. “Housing in the Colors of the G.D.R.” in Bengt Turner,  Jozsef Hegedüs, and Ivan Tosics, eds. The Reform of Housing in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. London and New York, Routledge, pp. 74‑144.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1992. “Why Conventional Self-Help Projects Won’t Work.” in Kosta Mathéy, ed. Beyond Self‑Help Housing, London and New York: Mansell,  (Munich, Profil Verlag) pp. 15‑22.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1992. “Gentrification und die wirtschaftliche Umstrukturierung New Yorks.” in Hans G. Helms, hrsg., Die Stadt als Gabentisch: Beobachtungen der Aktuellen Städtebauentwicklung. Reclam, Leipzig

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1994. “Privatization, Tenure, and Property Rights: Towards Clarity in Concepts.” in Berth Danermark and Ingemar Elander, eds. Social Rented Housing in Europe ‑ Policy, Tenure and Design,  The Netherlands, Delft University Press.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1993. “Degentrification and advanced homelessness: New patterns, old processes.” Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built Environment. vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 177‑192.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1994. “Is Anything Positive to be Learned from the GDR? Cities and Housing in Real Existing Socialism.” in Margy Gerber and Roger Woods, ed., Studies in GDR Culture and Society 13: Understanding the Past, Managing the Future. University Press of America, Lanham, Md., pp. 75‑86.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1994. “Mainstreaming Public Housing: For a Comprehensive Approach to Housing Policy.” Preiser, Wolfgang F. E., David Varady, and Francis Russell, eds. Future Visions of Urban Public Housing. Cincinnati, University of Cincinnati, College of Design, pp. 45-58.

 

Marcuse, Peter, David Burney, and Eftihia Tsitiridis. 1994.“New York City: Historical Perspectives, Current Policy, and Future Planning.” Preiser, Wolfgang F. E., David Varady, and Francis Russell, eds. Future Visions of Urban Public Housing. Cincinnati, University of Cincinnati, College of Design, pp. 59-70..

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1995. “Interpreting ‘Public Housing’ History” Journal of Architectural and Planning Research. Vol. 12, No. 3, Autumn, pp. 240-258.

 

Marcuse, Peter, and Tom Angotti. 1996. “An Isolated US Opposes Housing as a Human Right.” The Planners Network Newsletter, March.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1998. “Mainstreaming Public Housing: Proposal for a Comprehensive Approach to Housing Policy.” in Varady, David P., Wolfgang F.E. Preiser, and Francis P. Russell, New Directions in Urban Public Housing. New Brunswick, N.J.: Center for Urban Policy Research.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1996. “Housing Movements in the United States.” in: Uchida, Katsuichi, and Yosuke Hirayama. 1996. Housing Rights Movements in Comparative Perspective. Vol 5 of Human Settlement and the Right to Housing in Japan. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, pp. 91-126. (in Japanese)

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1998 “Drugs in Public Housing”. In Willem Van Vliet, ed. The Encyclopedia of Housing. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage Publications.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1999. “Housing Movements in the USA” in Housing, Theory and Society, vol 16, pp. 67-86.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 1999. “Comment: Islands of Decay in Seas of Renewal: Housing Policy and the Resurgence of Gentrification.” Housing Policy Debate. vol. 10, # 2, pp. 789-798.

 

“The Liberal-Conservative Divide in the History of Housing Policy in the United States” Housing Studies,  Vol. 16, No. 6, pp. 717-736. 2001.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 2004. “Are Social Forums the Future of Urban Social Movements?”  International Journal of Urban and Regional Research  2005 vol. 29 No. 2, pp. 417-424, with Rejoinder at pp. 444-446. An earlier version at http://www.urbancentre.utoronto.ca/elibrary.html#community

 

Marcuse, Peter. 2004, “Housing on the Defensive.” Practicing Planner, American Institute of Certified Planners, vol. 2, no. 4, 

 

“In Defense of Housing: For the Broader Engagement of Housing Research with Today’s Global Urban Context” Rejkjavik, Iceland, June 2005 http://borg.hi.is/enhr2005iceland/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=37

 

Marcuse, Peter, with Dennis Keating. 2006 “The Permanent Housing Crisis: The Failures of Conservatism and the Limitations of Liberalism”  In: A Right to Housing: Foundation for a New Social Agenda edited by Rachel G. Bratt, Michael E. Stone and Chester Hartman. Philadelphia: Temple University Press

 

 

Marcuse, Peter. 2005.“The Role of Government in the Housing Sector,” Commissioned paper for Task Force VIII, The Millennium Project, United Nations, New York City..

 

“O Caso Contra os Direitos de Propriedade,” [The Case Against Property Rights] in Marcio Moraes Valenca, ed.,2008, Cidade (i)legal, Rio de Janeiro: Maquad X, pp. 9-20.

 

Marcuse, Peter. “The Housing Change We Need.” Shelterforce, Winter 2008, #156, pp. 26-29.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 2009. “A Critical Approach to the Subprime Mortgage Crisis in the United States: Rethinking the Public Sector in Housing.” City & Community, vol. 8, No. 3,September, pp. 351-357.

Also in

Marcuse, Peter. “The Three Pillars of the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis – Analysis and Remedies..”  in Christopher Niedt and Marc Silver, eds. Forging a New Housing Policy: Opportunity in the Wake of Crisis. Hofstra University, National Center for Suburban Studies, n.d., pp. 12-16.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 2010. “On Gentrification: A Note from Peter Marcuse” [re: Slater Hamnett exchange]  CITY: Analysis of urban trends, culture, theory, policy, action.” Vol. 14, No. 1 & 2, pp. 187-188, February.

 

Marcuse, Peter. 2011.     “The Heresies in HUD’s Public Housing Policy.” Progressive Planning, Winter 2011, NO 186, pp. 2,26-27.

 

 

 

 

The Rich Default on their Mortgages

The New York Times headlined its article:  “Biggest Defaulters on Mortgages Are the Rich” (David Streitfeld, front page, July 9, 2010).  It seemed surprised. It shouldn’t have been.

There’s an important point that needs to be stressed in the account: these are largely investors engaging in strategic defaults. not  “homeowners” defaulting on mortgages. They are, to put it simply, landlords; these aren’t their homes that they are so heedlessly giving up. They are speculators in real estate, assuming, as the article says, that “real estate would never drop.” When the plain-talking owner of a $2 million house in Houston, quoted as a “plain-talking exception,”  says, “I just decided to let it go, give it back to the bank. I just didn’t feel like it was a good investment,” this isn’t a homeowner speaking, but a businessman talking about making or losing money.

The ownership of housing has two characteristics: it provides a home, shelter, privacy, hoped-for safety, a reflection of personality, for a resident homeowner, and it is an economic asset for the person having title to it. While the two are usually the same person, these two attributes of “ownership” are quite separate, although often confused. If you consider a house only as an asset, of course you would let it go if that’s the most profitable way of dealing with it. If you live in it as your only residence, your considerations are quite different.

If we could only keep these two aspects of ownership separate:  protect homeowners who have mortgages on homes that they need to live in, and take a quite different position as to landlords who own housing only on the speculative hope its value will rise, we’d be way ahead of the game. Of course resident homeowners also would like to make a profit when they sell; but that’s a different order of priorities from being secure in having a place to live. Limited equity ownership, community land trusts, and similar forms of ownership might be one answer.

Peter Marcuse

See the hyperlink: http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2010/07/09/business/09rich_graphic/09rich_graphic-popup.gif